Haley Monaghan
The Spanish Constitution of 1978
was born out of the death the authoritarian leader, General Francisco Franco. His
successor, Juan Carlos de Borbón, paved the way to democracy when he appointed
Adolfo Suárez as the new prime minister. Under the Suárez government, political
reform began in the shape of drafting a new constitution. This constitution may
not have been formed from a revolution; however, the preamble seems to focus on
restraining authority and allowing all to participate in government.
For example, the preamble contains
the goal to “promote wellbeing of all its members,” with “fair economic and
social order” and to ensure “rule of law as the expression of the popular will”
while “protect[ing] all Spaniards and peoples of Spain.” (1) These goals
suggest the implementation of a consensual democracy as defined and elaborated by
Lijphart in Patterns of Democracy. A consensual model is defined as
having executive power sharing, balancing of powers, a multiparty system,
proportional representation, strong bicameralism, federal, decentralized
government, constitution rigidity, judicial review, and central bank
independence (2). Spain contains these aspects in the constitution, except
judicial review.
The Spanish government is separated
appropriately to have executive power sharing and a balance of powers; A king
as the head of state who, under the constitution, has the power to appoint and
dismiss ministers, designates the candidates for the Presidential office,
expresses Spain’s consent in international treaties, and declares war/peace
(Section 63). The presidential candidate may be nominated by the King, but in
the end, is approved by the political parties represented in Parliament (Section
99). The Parliament, also referred to as the Cortes, consists of two Houses,
the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. All members in the bicameral
legislature are elected by universal, direct, equal, free and secret suffrage.
The elections are also conducted on the basis of proportional representation
(Section 69). The Cortes checks the
government through the constitutional right to question the Government (Section
111) and to establish enquiry committees on any matter of public interest
(Section 76). I speculate that this form of checks and balances makes it
unnecessary to have judicial review. This constitution may also not include
judicial review because “justice emanates fro the people”(Section 117). This
being said, since the legislature represents the populous proportionally, the
people’s voice is heard at the legislative level.
On the other hand, the Constitution
seems very difficult to amend, in subjective opinion. Bills and constitutions
must be approved by three-fifths of each House. However there is a multiple
step process that the bill or amendment must go through in order to be ratified
per Article 167. Possible evidence that it is difficult to amend is the fact
that it has only been amended twice in history. This may have just been out of
necessity, nonetheless, it seems to be a
very minimal amount of amendments to have been ratified in the past thirty-six
years since its birth.
In relation to the issue of central
bank independence, the Spanish Constitution does not explicit refer to a
national bank. Instead, Section 149 includes monetary actions under state
powers.
1. Spanish Constitution, 1978. www.congreso.es
2. Ljphart, Patterns of
Democracy
Taiki Fujimori
ReplyDeleteI agree with Haley’s analysis that Spain’s constitution implies a consensual model. I would like to elaborate upon how the electoral institutions of Spain laid out by the constitution supports the claim in the preamble that constitution will “Protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, of their culture and traditions, languages and institutions”(1).
The preamble section quoted above implies that there is a plurality of cultures, traditions and languages that will be protected by the State. This is recognition is supported by the section that defines the institution of the Cortes Generales. The Congress is mandated to contain between 300 and 400 seats, with the constituency being the Spanish province and the cities of Ceuta and Mellila which places the total number of constituencies at 52(2). By specifying in section 68.2 and 68.3 that each constituency will have a minimum initial representation and that candidates will be voted in via proportional representation, the constitution of Spain would have us predict that it will have a multi-party system which lends support to being a consensual model (3). This is further confirmed by the 13 parties in Spain that won seats in the 2011 election, though it is interesting that two parties gained 85% of the seats (4).
In addition to the lower chamber, the upper chamber of the Senate is defined as the “House of territorial representation” and divides the seats based on location. It includes specific provisions for how self-governing communities, as well as islands, will get some minimum representation (1). By giving representation based on location, it gives some assurance that regional communities will have some representation in the Cortes Generales, and that they will not be completely drowned out by larger constituencies. This section of the constitution (section 69) gives further evidence that the constitution supports the preamble’s claim that the constitution will protect the plurality of different peoples.
1. Spanish Constitution, 1978. www.congreso.es
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_electoral_districts_by_nation#Spain
3. Lijphart, Arend. “Patterns of Democracy”, pg 36.
4. ManifestoProject, 2014. https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/elections/206
Sharp ethnic cleavages in Spain create a situation where a consociational/federal structure makes sense. Despite what would seem like a largely federal structure based solely on the preamble, the Spanish government is perhaps more majoritarian in practice, although there has been a trend towards more consociationalist/federalist institutions since the 1978 Constitution was ratified (1).
ReplyDeleteAlthough some parts of the constitution point towards consociationalism, especially those that relate to "righting the wrongs" of the Franco regime (e.g., the preamble -- cultures, traditions, languages and institutions of all groups will be respected), the Constitution mandates Castilian Spanish as the official language, also requiring Spaniards to learn it (2)(Section 3). Although definitely more consociational than under the Franco dictatorship, the Catalonians and Basques -- the two groups that most desire greater autonomy from the central Spanish government -- have autonomy that Moreno sums up as “latent federalism" (1). Another way of looking at the Spanish situation would be as a hybrid between majoritarianism and consociationalism. Moreno shows the gradual trend towards regional spending since the Constitution was implemented, total regional spending passing from 3 to 35% in 2002, central spending (from Madrid) dropping from 87.3% in 1981 to 48.7%. Lijphart also lists Spain as a "semi-federal" country with a score of 3/5 (3).
Franco repressed ethnic minorities across Spain, especially the Catalans and the Basques. The Franco regime prohibited them from speaking their own languages in public and teaching it in schools. Although these restrictions were eased towards the end of Franco's rule, the 1978 Constitution made sure to reverse the stigma Franco attached to speaking minority languages. Power and spending, however, did not seem to trickle down to ethno-linguistic regions until later.
To add to Taiki's analysis, although two parties won a majority of the seats, the other 11 parties elected to congress are largely specific to a particular ethno-linguistic group, furthering evidence of the growing consociational structure of government after the end of the Franco regime. Spain has a bicameral legislature, but the lower house can overturn many of the upper house’s motions, making it largely asymmetrical (4).
(1) Moreno, Luis. "Federalization of multinational Spain." 2007. http://digital.csic.es/bitstream/10261/1679/1/dt-0704.pdf
(2) Spanish Constitution, 1978. www.congreso.es
(3) Lijphart, Arend. p. 189.
(4) Agranoff, Robert. 2006. “Federal Asymmetry and Intergovernmental Relations in Spain. http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/WorkingPapers/asymmetricfederalism/Agranoff2006.pdf
I also agree that the Spanish Constitution is weighted more heavily with consensual model aspects, however there are also aspects of the majoritarian model within the constitution that cannot be ignored. It is evident in the preamble that Spain wanted to redesign their previously strict authoritarian regime into a democratic government that redistributed basic rights and power back to the population (1). Spain’s new goal to create a “fair economic and social order” with “the rule of law as the expression of the popular will” clearly suggests consensual aspects and is enforced by the constitution in full (2).
ReplyDeleteThe Spanish constitution includes many sections that protect the rights of all citizens based on religion, race, and sex (section 14), and even extra provisions based on the protection of children (section 39) and promotion of culture and science (section 44). All Spanish citizens are also guaranteed the right to vote, even though they don’t actually elect the President. The President is nominated by the King and then confirmed by the Cortes Generales- an aspect representing the majoritarian model according to Lijphart (3). Because the president is not elected by popular vote, I cannot agree that the Spanish Constitution is fully consensual.
There are other aspects in the Spanish electoral system that agree with the consensual model more so. Both the Senate and Congress are elected using proportional representation in a multi-party system, which allows a broad representation of different parties and ethnicities to serve within the government (section 68-9). A party needs a minimum of three percent of the vote to qualify for representation in the parliamentary (1). This allows less popular parties to have a chance to serve in parliament, although they will be highly underrepresented compared to the larger more distinct parties (1). We can also see prominent aspects of the consensual model through the autonomy of municipalities and self-governing states within Spain. These districts have their own jurisdiction and are able to create policies and pass legislation on their own, under the guidelines of the government (section 150). These provisions help to foster Spain’s overall goal of equality and giving their population a voice in government.
1.Country Studies. http://countrystudies.us/spain/71.htm
2. Constitute-Spanish Constitution. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Spain_2011
3. Lijphart, Arend. "Patterns of Democracy", Chapter 2
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ReplyDeleteTo corroborate Haley’s analysis, the Spanish Constitution is evidently consensual just going off of Part I. Section 2 of the document. “The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards: it recognizes and guarantees the right to self government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” Moreover, to quickly piggyback off of Taiki’s point, the preamble itself implies a cultural plurality that is protected by the State through the institutions established by the constitution. With the Cortes Generales being bicameral as it is with houses that cater to proportional representation and regional proximity, multi-party systems emerge and minority interests are protected, thus reaffirming a consensual State (1). The consensual framework put in place by the document’s drafters was intended to make Spain a highly decentralized, unitary state.
ReplyDeleteIt is important to note that the Spanish constitution was formulated in 1978 as a democratic response to a dictatorship, as made clear by what has been said. This provides the rationale by which the drafters opted for a more consensual state that drew from the interests of various communities and ethnic groups. As a result, a form of federalism is present which is made explicit by Part VIII of the constitution that outlines the territorial organization of the state, in which municipalities are granted some degree of self-government. While Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 144 grants the Cortes Generales the authority to take over governance in the local realm, Spain, remains politically as a “State of Autonomies,” justified by Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 147.
The “Statute of Autonomy” gives autonomy to a given subnational unit by granting them the competencies to organize their respective governments under their own discretions. As a result, this has created 17 autonomous communities and 2 autonomous cities (2), which redistributes political power across municipalities allowing for a consensual form of governance nationally.
1. Lijphart, Arend. “Patterns of Democracy.” Chapter 2.
2. Moreno, Luis. “Federalization in Multinational Spain.” http://digital.csic.es/bitstream/10261/1679/1/dt-0704.pdf
3. Constitute. Spanish Constitution. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Spain_2011