As a constitutional monarchy Canada’s executive branch
includes both the Head of State and the Head of Government, and article III
section 12 stipulates that the Governor General shall be the Queen’s representative
as Head of State (1). The Canadian Constitution is less clear as to the
specifics of the Head of Government, which is the Prime Minister, yet it
follows the Westminster Model with a strong cabinet that dictates the policy
agenda of the ruling coalition (2). This is a parliamentary form of government,
where the executive’s power is predicated on the consensus of the cabinet (3). Following
elections the Governor General asks the Members of Parliament to form a
government, rather than a popularly elected President in presidential systems
like the United States (4). Though the cabinet is the dominant institution, its
members are also legislators from the House of Commons and are subject to
coalition politics that affect the stability of the coalition, which impacts
the executive’s ability to pass laws and to govern efficiently.
The ruling coalition, of which the cabinet is comprised of,
sets the policy agenda and has the ability to issue legislation for a vote,
such as in other parliamentary systems. Specific pieces of legislation must
originate in the House of Commons, such appropriation and tax bills (5). This
idea has its origins in the British parliamentary system, where it was
understood that most of the tax burden fell to “commoners” who more closely
elected the House of Commons as opposed to the House of Lords, or subsequently
the ruling coalition that dominated the executive branch (6). Thus, while this
grants the Prime Minister’s cabinet a lot of leeway to initiate their policy
agenda, the ministers within the cabinet act as veto players and can force
concessions that may impact the durability of the cabinet, and thus the
executive as a whole. However, as the table in Lijphart’s chapter on cabinets
illustrates, 76.8% of Canada’s cabinets are minimal-winning, and 100% of them
are one-party cabinets. As Canada’s cabinets are mostly minimal-winning and
seemingly entirely one-party, the executive has fewer veto players to contend
with since there tends not to be a need for a coalition cabinet. This is based
on Michael Leiserson’s theory which is cited by Lijphart, called “bargaining
position”, which maintains that executives will form coalitions with the
smallest number of parties tend to engage more easily in negotiations, making
it easier for the cabinet to enact its agenda (8).
Canada’s decision to include this executive structure stems
from its history with Great Britain as a colonial power. In the 1840’s a system
called “responsible government”, based in the Westminster Model, replaced the
former colonial government, and called for the executive branch to guide policy
making in the House of Commons (9). Another idea that was borrowed from the
British included the inclusion of Royal Assent into Canada’s Constitution;
Canada still recognized the Queen and as such would send bills approved by
Parliament to be formally signed by the Queen into law (10). Canada’s history
with Great Britain made the Queen their Head of State, and while it does not
impact today’s legislating by the executive its ceremonial status is still
expressed in Canada’s constitution.
1. Canadian Constitution, Article III Section 12 https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011#32
2. “Executive Branch
of Government in Canada,” House of
Commons, Canada
3. Lijphart Chapter 7, Page 106
4. “The Canadian Electoral System,” Parliament of Canada, http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/bp437-e.htm
5. Canadian Constitution, Article IV, Part 3, Section 53 https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011#181
6. “House of Commons Procedure and Practice: Historical
Perspective,” Parliament of Canada, http://www.parl.gc.ca/procedure-book-livre/Document.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&sbdid=F26EB116-B0B6-490C-B410-33D985BC9B6B&sbpid=DAD01B1C-462A-4B80-AB6D-26582F1D1BDE
7. Lijphart Chapter 6, Page 100
8. Lijphart Chapter 6, Page 83
9. Filippo Sabetti, “The Historical Context of
Constitutional Change in Canada,” Page 14, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3671&context=lcp
10. Canadian Constitution, Article IV, Part 3, Section 55 https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011#185
Elizabeth Caldwell
ReplyDeleteThe Canadian constitution is parliamentary with two government leaders (three if you count the Queen) including the Prime Minister as the Head of Government (1) and the Governor General as the Head of State (6). Powers differ significantly for both leaders but since the Prime minister is technically the head of government and the leader of parliament the executive and legislature are highly codependent. The Prime minister is appointed from the winning party by the Governor General (ceremonial appointment, this is usually the majority party leader) meaning the prime minister is connected to the executive (head of government as well as being appointed by the Governor General) and the legislative branches (head of parliament).
The Prime minister has a lot of legislative and executive powers including dictating when the Governor General should use most of his or her power (5) such as recommending elections, open and closing parliamentary sessions and dissolving parliament (3). He can also dictate who is to become a part of his cabinet and the size of his cabinet to a certain extent (1). He also has the power to dictate the budget: writing it then presenting it to the members of parliament. He can recommend the Governor General to the Queen and can issue new legislation through his position in the cabinet. The Prime Minister has a lot of power over their own party by using a carrot/stick approach since they can promote or demote party members in approximately 3,100 public servant positions including ambassadors, senators and judges (2).
The Governor General has a lot of power but most of it is ceremonial and is dictated by the suggestion of the Prime Minister (7). There are some significant powers the Governor General possess but they are wielded rarely including veto powers (8) that include a straight veto, hold for review by the Queen or a two-year delay (3). He can appoint the Prime minister if the incumbent dies in office (usually from the existing cabinet) or is the election is determined to be ‘hung’ (5). He’s technically the only one to be able to dissolve parliament (3) or dismiss the prime minister: the former of which is used under recommendation from the Prime Minister and the latter of which has never been used (4).
Power in Canada has gradually shifted from the Governor General to the Prime Minister (2). Since the Prime minister is elected and the Governor General is appointed by the Queen- this is in line with the gradual shift of towards independence of Canada from the English Monarchy (3).
1. http://canadaonline.about.com/cs/primeminister/a/pmrole.htm
2. http://mapleleafweb.com/features/prime-minister-cabinet-canada
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governor_General_of_Canada
4. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/the-delicate-role-of-the-governor-general-1.701974
5. http://canadaonline.about.com/cs/gg/a/ggrole.htm
6. http://www.gg.gov.au/governor-generals-role
7. http://www.gg.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/S179-2008-LettersPatent.pdf
8. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Veto#Canada
Elmer van der Vlugt
ReplyDeleteJesse’s analysis seems very accurate. The Canadian political system and its executive are indeed obviously based on the Westminster system the UK has, rendering the executive almost synonymous with the majority party in parliament. Lijphart notes this a well, with a high executive dominance score (1). However, there are a few significant differences that may be seen as a limit on the executive’s power, directly or indirectly.
Firstly, whereas the UK has an unwritten constitution that is unwritten and can be amended by a simple majority (2), amendments to the Canadian constitution generally also needs the approval of two-thirds of the provinces provided they represent at least 50 per cent of the population (3). In similar vein, the notwithstanding clause of the constitution allows the provinces to neglect civil rights in favour of provincial legislation. However, the parliament can overturn civil rights just as well, which balances the powers to an extent (4). In sum, these two federal provisions in the Canadian constitution arguably increase provincial power vis-à-vis the executive slightly.
Another way in which the executive’s power is limited is the fact that Canada has judicial review, which binds the legislature, and thus the executive, to the limits set in the constitution (3). Related to that, the justices of the Canadian Supreme Court are determined by the Governor General, who is determined by and represents the Queen of England, Supreme Court appointment is thus another power that the executive lacks (5). One should note though, that both parliament and the provinces have the power to neglect certain civil right provisions, through the afore-mentioned notwithstanding clause (4).
Lastly, one might think that the Senate, which is appointed by the Governor General, could limit executive power. However, Senators are appointed on the recommendation of the prime minister (6), who determines the Senate de facto, as the Governor General merely has ceremonial powers, as Elizabeth argues. Secondly, the Senate rarely rejects legislation and is regarded as non-partisan (7). Therefore, the Senate may be a theoretical check on the executive power, but it seldom is in practice.
In conclusion, there are a few federal provision which slightly decrease the executive’s relative power, together with the judicial review by the Supreme Court and the necessary agreement by the Senate. However, most of these do not seem to truly limit the executive dominance that Canada is characterised by.
References:
1: Assigned: Lijphart, Ch. 7, pg. 121
2: Assigned: Lijphart, Ch. 2, pg. 18
3: Original: Constitution of Canada, part V. Section 38.1: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011#1016 (accessed Nov. 9, 2014)
4: Original: Massey, Calvin R. “The Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of Canada and the United States” Duke Law Journal 1990(6), pgs. 1230-1231
5: Original: Constitution of Canada, part VII. Section 96: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011#423 (accessed Nov. 9, 2014)
6: Original: Parliament of Canada. http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Senate/Today/sens-e.html#devenir (accessed Nov. 9, 2014)
7: Original: Parliament of Canada. http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Senate/LegisFocus/focus-e.htm (accessed Nov. 9, 2014)
Stephen Siddall
ReplyDeleteI think Jesse’s analysis is well-done. He provides an insightful analysis in how Canada’s status of a constitutional monarchy in the Commonwealth of Nations has shaped its institutions and degree of executive power. I would like to focus on the role of the British monarchy in the Canadian constitution and in practice.
According to the text of the Canadian Constitution, the British monarch holds final executive power. The Constitution Act of 1867 section 9, clearly vests executive power in the Queen. (1) Sections 10 and 12 stipulate that the Queen may delegate her authority to the Governor General, who then exercises the royal prerogative. (1) The role of the Governor General is essentially a delegate for the Queen exercising her power in Canada. In section 55, he is given the power veto parliamentary legislation on behalf of the queen. (1) The governor general is also given the authority to appoint governors of provinces, as well as judges and other public servants. (1) Textually, the queen’s authority, exercised through the governor general, is very powerful, extending into nearly all facets of governmental affairs.
Though the Queen and her governor general may look surprisingly powerful constitutionally, their role in Canada’s executive branch of government is largely ceremonial. The queen serves as the monarch in the constitutional monarchy. Though she wields great ceremonial power, her political power is obsolete and marginalized. Like the queen, the governor general typically serves as the ceremonial head of state, performing roles such as hosting other heads of states and presenting state-sponsored awards. (2) The role of the governor general is largely non-political, although there have been several recent incidents in which the governor general has played a political role. For instance, in 2008 Governor General Michaelle Jean prorogued, or temporarily suspended parliament without dissolving it, in order to help solve a parliamentary dispute. (3) These incidents are rare and the governor general’s constitutional power is rarely used.
The dichotomy between the role of the monarchy in text and in practice is both profound and understandable. When the constitution was written, the political role of the monarch was much larger than it is today. Since Canada had a peacefully separation from Britain, it is understandable that it kept its ceremonial ties to the marginalized monarch. This explains why the constitution still vests executive power in the queen.
1. Canada’s constitution https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011
2. Roles and Responsibilities of the Governor General http://www.gg.ca/document.aspx?id=3
3. Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008%E2%80%9309_Canadian_parliamentary_dispute#The_role_of_the_Governor_General
David Smellie
ReplyDeleteAs has been stated by others, Canada has inherited a Parliamentary government from the United Kingdom [2]. As it is a parliamentary government, the Prime Minister is appointed by, and responsible to, the legislature. The Prime Minister also fulfills the role as the head of government in the current Canadian system. The head of state is however held by the Queen of England, whose authority is invested in the Governor General of Canada [2]. The Governor general has the ability to suspend or dissolve Parliament , swears in the Prime Minister, and grants Royal Assent, required for all legislation passed in Canada [5]. Although, this makes the governor general a very powerful position in theory, the power is rarely exercised. The Prime Minister also advises the Queen on the selection of the Governor General [5]. This system is fairly common in former-British colonies, with Australia also having a Governor general as Head of State [4]. These heads of state act very rarely with the Prime Minister having been forced to resign once in Australia in 1975 and never in Canada [4].
The idea behind separating the Head of State and Head of Government in order to provide a second voice in position that are unilaterally made in the US [4]. This helps to prevent abuse of power and its need is reflected in the weaker judicial systems Westminsterian governments tend to possess when compared to the incredibly strong one in the US [3]. Canada, interestingly has developed a stronger court system since its founding, potentially leaving the Governor General as a redundant check on the power of the Prime Minister [3][4]. This may be a desired outcome however, in order to reduce executive power due to the feelings of a growing cleavage group in Quebec who wish for more protections as opposed to simply an anachronous position that still exists in Canada. It may also be maintained as Canadians desire the separation of the Head of State and the Head of Government [4].
References:
1. Assigned: CCW Files on Canada: “Canada constitution.doc”
2. Canadian constitution.https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011.pdf
3. Assigned: Lijphart Chapter 12
4.The Delicate Role of the Governor General http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/the-delicate-role-of-the-governor-general-1.701974
5. The Governor General of Canada. http://www.gg.ca/index.asp