By Sabrina Weeks-Brittan
The Argentine Constitution establishes a presidential system
of government, with the executive wielding strong powers. Like the United States, the President of Argentina
is Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
(1). The Argentine President appears, in many ways, to have powers similar to
those vested in the President of the United States. However, a history of hyper-presidentialism
in Argentina reinforces that the country lacks the same checks and balances
enumerated in the U.S. Constitution.
Recent amendments to the Argentine Constitution in 1994 worked to curb
the president’s exaggerated powers, but the strength of the Argentine Executive
still overshadows that of the other branches (1).
Fundamental to presidential systems, “The President and Vice-President of the [Argentine]
Nation shall be directly elected by the people” (2). Constitutional reform in 1994 reduced the
president’s term from six years to four, but made possible the chance to run
for one consecutive term of reelection (3).
While extensive amendments were made to curb executive powers, such as
reducing the president’s influence over the Judiciary, the Argentine President
still wields powers that seem to oppose the separation of powers and checks and
balances key to presidentialism in the first place (3). With only the President comprising the
Executive Branch, the Vice President is interestingly included in the
Legislative Branch, as “President of the Senate” (4). Also unlike the U.S. President, Argentina’s
has the authority to appoint Cabinet, and other high-level officials without
the Legislative Branch’s approval (1).
Despite some remaining evidence of hyper-presidentialism in
Argentina, the constitutional reform in 1994 did successfully establish
judiciary independence and greatly increased the Legislative Branch’s autonomy:
“The Executive Power shall in no event issue provisions of legislative nature,
in which case they shall be absolutely and irreparably null and void” (5). The Argentine President does, however,
promulgate the laws approved by Congress and holds veto power over them (5).
While hyper-presidentialism in Argentina seems to be both
the result of lax constitutional separation of powers and a recent history of
instability illustrated by “six coups and twenty-four years of de facto governments between 1930 and
1983,” the constitutional reform of 1994 was relatively successful at curbing
the exaggerated powers of the Argentine Executive (6). Though Argentina has faced political instability
characteristic of presidential democracies, presidentialism made sense for the
nation following its independence from in Spain 1816 (6). Intermittent civil wars directly followed the
Argentine War of Independence from Spain.
The Constitutional Convention in 1853 made apparent the necessity of a
strong executive to the otherwise war-torn nation. Evidence of this hyper-powerful president
remains today, but the constitutional reforms of 1994 mostly achieved its goal
to further separate the powers and restore a system of effective checks and
balances (6).
1) “Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without
Checks and Balances in Argentina and Phillippines” by Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Diane A. Desierto, and Natalia Volosin
2) Constitution of the
Argentine Nation, Chapter 2 Section 94
3) “Argentina’s Presidency—Not So Super Powers,” The Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/7281097
4) Constitution of the
Argentine Nation, Chapter 2 Section 57
5) Constitution of the
Argentine Nation, Chapter 3 Section 99
6) “The Argentine
Republic” by Jonathan M. Miller
I agree with Sabrina that the Argentine President holds significant power in the governmental system. This is evident, as she mentioned, through other branches lacking checks and balances power and the 1994 reforms that attempted to curb those excessive powers. Despite numerous similarities to the United States, the Argentine President maintains significantly more power than other branches, this is partially due to the historical context and nature of the early democratization processes (although many original powers are not held today).
ReplyDeleteThe following were important factors that led to the substantial powers of the President. The first factor is the titles of the President. The Argentine President is the head of state, head of government, and head of the armed forces (1). Additionally, until the 1994 reforms, the President was the head of the public administration and had the power to appoint the mayor of Buenos Aries (2). The democratically elected Presidents were also primarily “undisputed” leaders within their parties (2). This strong leadership allowed for considerable support from the public and Congress to approve legislation and carryout executive orders without serious opposition (2). Strong party loyalties were prioritized over delegated powers, which provides an additional explanation for why the system of checks and balances is not as strong as in other federalist democracies (2). The political history of Argentina is characterized by a period of coups in which military regimes took control of the government during the early to mid 1900s (3). During this period, congress and provincial governments lost significant power, and those powers still remain with the executive today (3).
One aspect that I find to be very interesting and unique is the notion of a national sense of political tradition surrounding the Presidency. There is a strong cultural respect for the Presidency as an office (2). Many citizens consider the President to be “the center from which political power is and should be exercised” (2). I find this trait to be unique as much of political power is derived from subjective attitudes of the Argentine people which is characteristic of traditional monarchies. This contributes to the desire for public social and political demands to be jurisdiction of the president (2).
In addition to factors regarding titles, position within political parties and previous regime changes influencing the power of the President, the prestige of the presidency and the highly esteemed opinion of the public contributed greatly as well.
1.Argentine Constitution
2.http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Presidential_Power_and_Political_Crisis.pdf
3.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Reorganization_Process
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ReplyDeleteBy Sean Smalley
DeleteAs Sabrina and Allisa both noted, the executive branch in Argentina completely dominated over the legislative and judicial branches of government in the constitution of 1853. The irony behind the establishment of the Argentine executive is that during the formation of the constitution, the nation had recently suffered from a dictatorship under Juan Manuel de Rosas (1). Therefore, I would have expected the constitution to at least present a system of checks and balances on executive power, power that the leader of the previous regime abused considerably. However, no such system existed in the 1853 constitution. Instead, the President of Argentina, who is the head of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief, assumes the most authority (2) was the absolute authority by design of the 1853 constitution. Even the Vice-President is considered by some to be part of the legislative branch, as he/she is the leader of the Senate (1).
The 1994 constitutional reform attempted to limit the hyper-presidentialism that presided over the structure of the government. Among the highlights of the amendment to the constitution were the expansions of both judicial and legislative powers via the establishment of the Consejo de la Magistratura (Judiciary Council) as well as the office of the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers (3). The intention behind this of course was to attenuate the dominance of the executive branch. Specifically the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers serves as a check on the power of the President. Article 100 of the Argentine Constitution outlines the purpose of the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers, as it states that the political office “shall endorse and legalize the acts of the President through their signatures, without which the [President’s] acts have no effect” (2). In this regard, the 1994 constitutional reform succeeded in reducing hyper-presidentialism in Argentina by increasing the role of the legislative branch.
That being said, the President, and therefore the executive, still even post-1994 amendment overshadows the other two branches in some ways. As aforementioned in Sabrina’s post, the President holds the ability to appoint high-ranking officials without approval from the legislative branch (2). Furthermore, the President can veto any laws passed by Congress (2). Ultimately, the President and the executive in general still have the final say when it comes to political decision-making in Argentina.
(1) Constitution of Argentina http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Argentina
(2) Constitute https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Argentina_1994
(3) 1994 amendment of the Argentine Constitution http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_amendment_of_the_Argentine_Constitution
I’d like to examine the role of the cabinet as an intermediary between the executive and the legislative branches of the Argentine government. The president does have the ability to appoint whomever he wants as part of his cabinet, with no oversight or approval measures given to the legislative branch. (2) I believe this allows the argument to be made that the cabinet is essentially part of the executive branch, but I will not delve into that.
ReplyDeleteIn Article 100 of the Argentine Constitution, the position of Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers is created, and is said to have “political responsibility to the National Congress” (2). The Article goes on to enumerate thirteen powers given to the Chief of the Cabinet. Number one of which is “to exercise the general administration of the country,” which is about as broad of a declaration as possible, but that’s beside the point. With the President, who officially occupies the only position in the executive branch, in charge of the cabinet’s appointment, it seems as though the cabinet will generally have the same political tendencies as the President. This holds true in the current administration, with twelve out of the fifteen ministers who associate with a political party from the same Justicialist Party as the president (1).
The Cabinet essentially seems to function as a connection between the executive and legislative branches of the government. Article 100 specifically mentions the Chief of the Cabinets responsibility to “send to Congress the bills concerning the Ministries and the National Budget, after previous [favorable] treatment at a Cabinet meeting and approval by the Executive Power,” (2) and further, “To produce the verbal or written reports and explanations that any of the Chambers may request from the Executive Power” (2).
I believe that the fact that the Argentine Constitution enumerates all of these specific powers inherently limits the absolute power of the President. The Cabinet, although obviously generally politically aligned with the President, functions as somewhat of a check on the sole executive’s power. This is especially true considering the Chief of the Cabinet can be removed from office by a majority of the National Congress, therefore any collusion between the executive and the cabinet is easily punishable (3). They are constitutionally obligated to provide any and all information the legislative branch requests, and this leads to increased transparency and holds the executive fully accountable for any actions he/she may take.
Citations:
(1) Constitution of Argentina http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Argentina
(2) Constitute https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Argentina_1994
(3) Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and Phillippines” by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Diane A. Desierto, and Natalia Volosin
Sabrina provides a strong analysis of the Argentina’s executive branch. Sabrina clearly notes that similarly to the United States, the President of Argentina holds the powers of Head of State, Head of Government, and Commander-in-Chief (1). Yet, as Sabrina explains, due to the history of government in Argentina the executive branch is the strongest branch in Argentina’s government, and is not kept in check by the same checks and balances used in the United States. Sabrina also provided a good summary of the structure and power of the executive branch, but there is one key point that I believe still needs to be included. The Constitution does provide the judiciary branch with protection from the executive branch, “In no case the President of the Nation shall exercise judicial functions, assume jurisdiction over pending cases, or reopen those already adjudged”(2).
ReplyDeleteArgentina addresses the executive branch in a very unique manner. As Sabrina mentioned, the executive branch of Argentina lacks many checks and balances, and grants substantial power to the executive due to a history of hyper-presidentialism in Argentina. Yet, as was made clear by the 1994 constitutional reform, Argentina is moving towards a more equally balanced system of government. For example, previously the President of Argentina was elected into a six-year term, but in the 1994 constitutional reform the President’s term was shortened to a four-year term with the option for one consecutive term of reelection (3). This change shows a clear movement in the Argentinian Constitution away from hyper-presidentialism towards a more democratic and balanced executive branch.
Although reforms are shifting the constitution to have a greater balance of power, Argentina’s historical hyper-presidentialism still plays a massive roll in the power granted to the President. For example, the Constitution of Argentina specifies, “The President of the Nation leaves the day that his four year term expires”(4). The fact that something of that that nature had to be included in the constitution shows that Argentina is clearly coming from a past where leaders were overly powerful and would abuse their power (not step down from office).
(1) “Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and Phillippines” by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Diane A. Desierto, and Natalia Volosin
(2) Constitution of the Argentine Nation, Chapter 1 Section 109
(3) “Argentina’s Presidency—Not So Super Powers,” The Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/7281097
(4) Constitution of the Argentine Nation, Chapter 1 Section 91